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Ellen Lust-Okar received her Ph.D. from Univeristy of Michigan 
in 1997 and is currently Assistant Professor of Political Science at 
Yale University.  
Her research concerns the dynamics of political opposition, the 
formation of political institutions, and the links between foreign 
policy and domestic crisis, focusing on the Middle East. Her 
articles have appeared in International Interactions, Middle 
Eastern Studies, and edited volumes.  
She is also author of Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: 
Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions (Cambridge University 
Press), which examines how ruling elites manage and manipulate 
their political opposition in the Middle East.  
Syria has and continues to figure prominently in debates about 
American foreign policy. Because Syria is located at the heart of 
the Middle East and U.S. foreign relations in that area have 
changed in the wake of the Iraq war, Syria's authoritarian regime 
and American-Syrian relations have been widely discussed.  
Ellen Lust-Okar is one of a few scholars who have examined the 
prospects for political reform and democratization in Syria. Given 
the delicate stability of Syria's authoritarian regime and the 
weakness of the political opposition in the country, Lust-Okar 
believes that the prospects for democratization in Syria are dim. 
However, she argues, it would be counterproductive for the 
United States to push for regime change in Syria, in part because 
of the difficulty and instability encountered in trying to establish 
democracy in Iraq.  
Neoconservatives in Washington have argued that the United 
States should push for regime change in Syria for several 
reasons. First, Syria was one of the two Arab countries governed 
by the Baath party. Second, Syria supported political groups that 
oppose America's key ally, Israel, in both Palestine and Lebanon. 
However, this neoconservative vision for effecting change has not 
materialized. In fact, in the aftermath of Sept. 11, Syria provided 
valuable assistance to the United States. It is only recently that 
U.S.-Syrian relations once again deteriorated, with Syria keeping 
its place on the U.S. list of supporters of terrorism.  
Perhaps more important to Syrian politics than the Baath party, 
Lust-Okar said, is the decades-long rule of the Assad family. 
However, this constant variable has recently undergone a major 
change. With the death of his father, Bashar Al-Assad -- until 
then a minor player in Syrian politics -- became the Syrian 
president in 2000.  
Because Bashar was educated in the West and seemed to have 
modern outlook, many onlookers in Syria and around the world 
began to have great expectations about political opening and 
liberalization of the regime. In fact, Syrian-Western relations 
initially improved and cooperation toward reform was achieved in 
a number of areas. For example, after decades of crackdown and 
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repression, opposition parties were given some freedom in 
organization and expression. Local elections have been held, 
albeit with restrictions.  
However, such steps have fallen short of democratization. Lust-
Okar gave two reasons for this and for the low prospects for 
reform in Syria in general. First, the Syrian opposition itself is 
deeply divided. While those living outside Syria fully support 
regime change, those living in Syria worry about the negative 
consequences that the process of regime change might bring 
about. They believe that sectarian divisions could divide the 
country, much like the chaos that has emerged in Iraq in the 
absence of an authoritarian regime.  
Another dynamic is also at work. Opposition figures outside of 
Syria lack a political following within Syria and therefore cannot 
effect meaningful change. Meanwhile, opposition figures in Syria 
must operate within the limits established by the Syrian regime 
itself. This means they must undertake a careful balancing act 
between pushing for change and not antagonizing the 
government. As a result, they are not likely to effect major 
change either.  
The second reason for the low prospects for democratization in 
Syria is more subtle and concerns the nature of recent reforms, 
Lust-Okar said. Namely, the Syrian regime has allowed for 
certain openings as a way to bring the opposition groups under 
more careful control. Like the regime, many opposition leaders 
want to keep Syria together and therefore stress unity among 
their groups. Ironically, these opposition leaders help 
government maintain control, opposition figures have to keep a 
close eye on developments in their own ranks.  
The Assad regime in Syria justifies its authoritarian rule in other 
ways as well, Lust-Okar said. First, while the majority of Syrians 
are Sunni, the regime is minority Allawi. For this reason, wide 
sections of Syrian society do not support the regime; however, 
even worse than the prospect of continued Assad rule is the 
ever-present fear of sectarian and ethnic divisions. Hence, the 
regime plays on the fear of possible breakdown to justify its 
authoritarian rule. Second, the Assad regime emphasizes the 
danger of Islamists, and conservatives are portrayed as posing a 
grave threat to Syria. This provides the regime with a mandate to 
crack down on such opposition, ostensibly in order to preserve 
Syria.  
Finally, Lust-Okar argued that it would be counterproductive for 
the United States to overtly push for regime change in Syria for 
three reasons. First, if the United States supports Syrian 
opposition groups logistically or financially, Syrians will see those 
groups as illegitimate and their actions will be discredited. 
Second, given the difficulties and costs of the Iraqi operation, the 
United States would be ill-advised to bring about regime change 
by force in yet another country with sectarian divisions. A more 
effective strategy would be to advocate human rights and civil 
rights.  
Finally, U.S. interests may be better served by preserving 
stability in Syria than by trying to democratize it. In the fight 
against terror, American foreign policymakers appear to be, at 
least in the case of Syria, in favor of eliciting cooperation than 
pushing for change with uncertain consequences.  
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